NY Times: Scientists Bridle at Lecture Plan for Dalai Lama"He has been an enthusiastic collaborator in research on whether the intense meditation practiced by Buddhist monks can train the brain to generate compassion and positive thoughts. Next month in Washington, the Dalai Lama is scheduled to speak about the research at the annual meeting of the Society for Neuroscience.
But 544 brain researchers have signed a petition urging the society to cancel the lecture, because, according to the petition, 'it will highlight a subject with largely unsubstantiated claims and compromised scientific rigor and objectivity'...
'If one reads the published scientific literature, it is not difficult to see that this claim is far from being proven. It will not hurt if the public also realizes that some researchers are declared believers playing dual roles as advocates and researchers'."
This is definitely an article to save for class next term as it rather nicely highlights the ways in which science positions itself against not-science. According to
Popper and others, objective or scientific knowledge is understood to be distinct or separate from personal reflection or feelings, whereas subjective or non-scientific knowledge is considered to be biased, irrational or ideological. On the other hand,
Kuhn argues that scientific method is a social enterprise where scientific worldviews are collectively agreed upon and changed, and
Longino pushes even further by claiming that "it is, of course, nonsense to assert the value-freedom of natural science. Scientific practice is governed by norms and values generated from an understanding of the goals of scientific inquiry ... and contextual values [that] belong to the social and cultural environment in which science is done."
This starts to get at how the radical contingency of science solidifies through processes of excluding whatever is not-science. Typically, whether we talk of science or technology, we say that people
shape and are
shaped by them. (This comes from the hylomorphic distinction between form and matter, or appearance and essence.) But in this model there is no way of accounting for ongoing processes of formation through which the surfaces and boundaries of science and not-science, or technology and not-technology, are stabilised. A more
transductive (following
Simondon and Deleuze) account denies that there is something essentially human and something essentially scientific or technological that meet each other in-the-world. Instead, what is 'human' and what is 'science' or 'technology' achieves "internal resonance" not because it exists in relation to something else, but because "
individuation is the 'theatre or agent' of an interactive communication between different orders." In other words, the signifiers 'science' or 'technology' do not refer to any single signified or semiotic substance. Instead of understanding technology or science as universal (necessary, inevitable, etc.), I'm interested in how they can be understood as singular and contingent, or how they
become 'technology' and 'science' in particular and variable ways.